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THE

SPORHASE

CASE:

CAN A STATE CONSTITUTIONALLY
PROHIBIT THE EXPORTATION OF
GROUNDWATER OUTSIDE THE STATE?

I.

THE FACTS.

A.

Joy Sporhase and Delmer Moss

Colorado.

In 1972,

and contiguous
County,

they purchased adjacent

tracts

Colorado,

of land in Phillips

and Chase County,

On the Nebraska tract,
state line,

was

are residents of

Nebraska.

a few feet from the

an irrigation well which had

been constructed by the prior owners of the
property.

Sporhase and Moss

pivot sprinkler

Colorado tract

irrigation system on the

and an underground pipe

the Nebraska well to
irrigate the Colorado
B.

Neither

installed a center

Sporhase

the

sprinkler system to

tract.

and Moss nor

the previous

owners had applied for a permit to
ground water from the Nebraska well
in Colorado
statute.

from

transport
for use

in compliance with a Nebraska

Upon receipt of a

complaint,

Nebraska Department of Water Resources

K-l

the
advised

Sporhase and Moss

in 1976

that they were

transporting ground water outside Nebraska

in violation of Nebraska law.

C.

In 1977,

the Nebraska Attorney General

initiated an action against Sporhase and
Moss

to

enjoin them from transporting ground

water from the Nebraska well

for use

in

Colorado.

D.

On May 8,

1981,

the Nebraska Supreme Court

rejected Sporhase and Moss's
Neb.

Rev.

Stat.

§ 46-613.01

was unconstitutional.

argument that
(Reissue 1978)

The case

on appeal to the United States

II.

THE

STATUTES.

A.

The Nebraska Statute:

is

presently

Supreme Court.

46-613.01.
Any person, firm,
city, village, municipal corp

oration or any other entity
intending to withdraw ground
water from any well or pit
located in the State of Nebraska
and transport it for use in an
adjoining state shall apply to
the Department of Water Resources
for a permit to do so.
If the
Director of Water Resources

finds that the withdrawal of the
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water requested is reasonable,
is not contrary to the con
servation and use of ground
water, and is not otherwise
detrimental to the public
welfare, he shall grant the
permit if the state in which
the water is to be used grants
reciprocal rights to withdraw
and transport ground water

from that state for use in
the State of Nebraska.

B.

The Colorado

Statute:

37-90-136.
For the purpose of
aiding and preserving unto the
state of Colorado and all its
citizens the use of all ground
waters of this state, whether
^
r

tributary or nontributary to a
natural stream, which waters are
necessary for the health and
prosperity of all the citizens

of the state of Colorado, and
for the growth, maintenance, and

general welfare of the state, it
is unlawful for any person to
divert, carry or transport by
ditches, canals, pipelines,
conduits, or any other manner
any of the ground waters of
this state, as said waters are in
this section defined, into any
other state for use therein.

III.

THE NEBRASKA SUPREME COURT DECISION.
A.

State ex.
703,

prob.

rel.

305 N.W.

juris,

Douglas v.
2d 614

noted,
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Sporhase,

(1981)

208 Neb

(Appendix A),

Sporhase v.

Nebraska,

No.

81-613,

argued March

IV.

102
30,

S.

Ct.

631

(Nov.

30,

1981),

1982.

ISSUES BEFORE THE UNITED STATES

SUPREME COURT.

1.
Whether Neb. Rev. Stat.
§ 46-613.01 (Reissue 1978),
which requires a permit for
the exportation of water
from the state and using the

consideration of reciprocity
of the receiving state's laws,
violates the Commerce Clause,
Article I, Section 8 of the
United States Constitution?
2.
Whether the Congress has
exempted the regulation of
water from the application
of the Commerce Clause of
Article I, Section 8 of the
United States Constitution
and left this power to the
states?
3.
Whether Neb. Rev. Stat.
§ 46-613.01 (Reissue 1978)
requiring a permit to export
water conditioned upon reci
procity in the receiving
state violates the Equal
Protection or Due Process
Clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United
States

V.

Constitution?

THREE DECISIONS; THREE APPROACHES TO
CLAUSE CHALLENGES.

A.

Hudson County Water Co.
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v.

COMMERCE

McCarter,

209 U.S

349

(1908)

(Appendix B).

A New Jersey statute

prohibiting the transport of surface waters
for use

in another state upheld against

challenge under the commerce

grounds,

inter alia,

that

clause on the

"(a)

man may not

acquire a right to property by his
use
B.

it

desire

Weiland v.

Pioneer Irrigation Company,

498

(Appendix C).

(1922)

259

U.S.

An irrigation company

from the North Fork of the

Republican River in Colorado which was

f"

to

in commerce among the states."

diverting water

A

a

sold

for agricultural use on lands

in Colorado and

Nebraska brought

the

suit against

Colorado

State Engineer for not enforcing its prior
ity against junior appropriators

in Colorado.

The irrigation company alleged that

federal right to engage

its

in commerce between

the states by transporting water from Colorado
and selling it

in Nebraska was being impaired

by Colorado officials.
governed by the

the issue was

doctrine of equitable apportion

ment of interstate waters.

The Pioneer decree

was

the

later

incorporated

River Compact.
/^

Held,

Art.

(Appendix D).
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V,

into

57 Stat.

Republican

86

(1943)

/|

C.

City of Altus,

828
35

(W.D.
(1966)

Oklahoma v.

Tex.),

Carr,

255 F.

aff d per curiam,

(Appendix E).

Supp.

385 U.S.

A Texas statute pro

hibiting transport of ground water outside the
state without legislative authorization de
clared unconstitutional

as

an unreasonable

burden on interstate commerce.
Water Co.

grounds
Texas,

sion

is

v.

McCarter distinguished on the

that under the law of the State of
ground water once reduced to posses

personal property

therefore,

VI.

Hudson County

is

subject to

sale and,

an article of commerce.

'

IS GROUND WATER IN NEBRASKA AN ARTICLE OF COMMERCE?
A.

Much attention was

devoted in the briefs

filed with the United States

Supreme Court

to

the question of whether ground water in
Nebraska is

an "article of commerce".

Nebraska follows a variant of the American

doctrine of "reasonable use" of ground water.
According

to

the Nebraska Attorney General,

ground water used for agricultural purposes
can be used only on overlying
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lands,

and is

therefore not an "article of commerce".

But

consider the following exchange between the
Supreme Court

and counsel

for Sporhase and

Moss:

QUESTION:

Now,

Nebraska law,

tell me

can —

again.

Under

are water rights

transferable between private parties?
MR. DUDDEN:

Yes,

QUESTION:
MR.

they are,

Your Honor.

For money?

DUDDEN:

QUESTION:

For money.

And

are

they

--

are

can they be separated from the
MR.

DUDDEN:

However,

Yes,

in most

they

land?

I believe they could be.
instances,

Your Honor,

the transfer of water for money is
in the price of the
*

*

QUESTION:

--

involved

land.

*

What

if

I in Nebraska -- what

if your client wanted to

his

water right

to

MR.

DUDDEN:

could

He

--

wanted to

an adjoining
do

that,

sell

landowner?
Your Honor,

but the water registration specifically
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provides

for the water to be used on

agricultural
lying

land.

call

it over

agricultural land.

QUESTION:

All right.

transfer it to
ral

They

But you can

another piece of agricultu

land?

MR. DUDDEN:
QUESTION:

Yes,

he

could.

And in that

sense

--

and he

could be paid for it?
MR. DUDDEN:

QUESTION:

Yes,

in Nebraska.

In Nebraska.

Now,

in that

sense it's an article of commerce.
MR.

DUDDEN:

QUESTION:

Absolutely,

But he cannot

absolutely.

-- he could

not under this law,

I take it,

that water right to

somebody in Colorado?

MR.

DUDDEN:

QUESTION:

That

is

correct,

sell

Your Honor.

Suppose it's very good water

that your client has on his
he bottle it and sell

land.

Could

it over in Omaha and

Lincoln?

y^BBS\
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/^

Mr.

DUDDEN:

Nebraska has

Supreme Court has

--

the Nebraska

approved the commercial

sale of water for drinking purposes.
QUESTION:

it's
MR.

yes.
B.

Well,

that gives

an article of commerce,
DUDDEN:

I felt that

.

.

some hint that

doesn't it?

it did,

Your Honor,

That's our position.

Assuming ground water in Nebraska is an article

of commerce,

does the State of Nebraska have any

claim on the basis of sovereignty to prevent

the export of ground water for use outside the
state?

C.

Would the answer be different,

if the ground

water had been equitably apportioned between
Colorado and Nebraska and Sporhase and Moss
were

exporting ground water which had been

apportioned to Nebraska?
D.

Does
any

the Nebraska anti-export
legitimate

state

interest

ground water within the state?

J
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statute serve
in conserving

E.

If congress has

exempted state regulation of

water from the commerce clause,

of Altus,
F.

Does

Oklahoma v.

should City

Carr be overruled?

the reciprocity requirement

Nebraska statute

interest

serve

any

in conserving

in the

legitimate

state

ground water by pro

moting complementary ground water policies

adjoining states.
Pacific Tea Co.,

in

Compare Great Atlantic &
Inc.

v.

Cottrell,

366

(1976),

Co.

v.

Bd.

of Equalization,

101 S.

Ct.

2070

424 U.S.

with Western and Southern Life

Ins.

U.S.

,

^

(1981).

FURTHER READING

Hellerstein,

Clause,
Ct.

Rev.

Hughes v.

Oklahoma:

The Court,

the Commerce

and State Control of Natural Resources,

1979,

Sup.

51.

Ladd, Federal
Law:
Support
267 (1981).

and Interstate Conflicts in Montana Water
for a State Water Plan, 42 Mont. L. Rev.

Schenkkan & Anson,

Federalism,

the

Clause, and State-Owned Resources,
71 (1980).

Dormant

Commerce

59 Texas L.

Rev.

White, Reasonable State Regulation of the Interstate
Transfer of Percolating Water, 2 Nat. Resources Law 383
(1969).
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Comment, Do State Water Anti-Exportation Statutes
Violate the Commerce Clause?
Or Will New Mexico's
Embargo Law Hold, Nat. Resources J. 617 (1981).
Comment, "It's Our Water". -- Can Wyoming Constitution
ally Prohibit the Exportation of State Waters?, 10

Land & Water L.

Rev.

119

(1975).

Note, Interstate Transfer of Water -- The Western
Challenge to the Commerce Clause, 59 Texas L. Rev.
(1981).(forthcoming).
Clyde & Clyde,
Exportation of
Allocation.

State Prohibitions on the Interstate
Scarce Water Resources, Water Resources

Laws and Emerging Issues (1981 Conference,
of Colorado School of Law).

K-ll

University

STATE EX REL. DOUGLAS v. SPORHASE

Neb.

617

Cite as. Neb.. S05 KM .26 614

Vi'ahoo, 184 Neb. 802, 248 N.W. 304 (1933).

Transfer of ground water was considered

The Olson court specifically rejected the

by the Legislature in 1963.

"English rule" of rights in ground water,

§§ 46-638 through 46-650 (Reissue 1978),

which

of

enacted that year, and § 46-654, enacted in

ground water in the overlying landowner.

1965, granted only to cities, villages, and

recognizes

absolute

ownership

Neb.Rev.Sut.

Instead, the court adopted a slightly modi

municipal corporations the right to trans

fied version of the more restrictive Ameri

port ground water out of its basin of origin

can rule of "reasonable use"; "The Ameri

for the purpose of supplying urban water

can rule is that the owner of land is entitled

needs.

to appropriate subterranean waters found

ground water permitted use of the water

Since the Nebraska common law of

under his land, but he cannot extract and

only on the overlying land, legislative action

appropriate them in excess of a reasonable

was necessary to allow for transfers off the

and beneficial use upon the land which he

overlying land, even for as pressing a need

owns, especially if such use is injurious to

as supplying urban water users.

others who have substantial rights to the
waters, and if the natural underground sup

Metropolitan

Beach

Co.,

Utilities

179

Neb.

Dist.

783,

v.

Merritt

799-800,

140

ply is insufficient for all owners, each is

N.W.2d

entitled to a reasonable proportion of the

"[underground

whole, and while a lesser number of states

percolating waters or underground streams,

have adopted this rule, it is, in our opinion,

are a part of the waters referred to in the

supported by the better reasoning."

Constitution as a natural want. . . .

811, 248 N.W. at 308.

Id. at

626,

636

(1966),

waters,

confirmed

that

whether they be

[I]t is

The "pure" American

becoming more important and extremely

rule, as stated by other authorities at the

necessary that regulation and control of all

time, did not include the concept of sharing

sources of water supply be aUained."

in times of shortage, and the Olson court's

court held that it is "the right of the Legis

That

inclusion of that concept demonstrates its

lature, unimpaired, to determine the policy

view that water is a unique commodity

of the state as to underground waters and

subject to state regulation to assure that it

the rights of persons in their use."

is available to everyone in the state in rela

801, 140 N.W.2d at 637.

Id. at

The opinion clearly

tion to their need, rather than their ability

held that the Legislature has the power to

to pay for it.

determine

The

Nebraska

Constitution

declares

water for irrigation purposes in the State of
Nebraska to be a natural want
Art. XV, § 4.

Neb.ConsL

The decades of the 1930's

and 1940's saw a quantum expansion in
Nebraska of the use of ground water for

irrigation.

See Aiken, Nebraska Ground

Water Law and Administration, 59 Neb.L.
Rev. 917 (1980).

Legislative recognition of

public

policy

with

regard

to

ground water and that it may be transfer
red from the overlying land only with the
consent of and to the extent prescribed by
the public through its elected represenUtives.

Only a year after the decision in the

Metropolitan case, the Legislature enacted
the statute at issue in this case, § 46-613.01,
dealing with transfer of Nebraska ground

the slate's power and the corresponding

water across state lines.

need to manage the state's ground water
resources began in 1957 when the Legisla

such transfers conditioned on the receipt of
a permit from the director of the Depart

The statute allows

of

ment of Water Resources, who may grant

ground water and the beneficial use thereof

the permit if the transfer "is reasonable, is

ture declared

"that

the conservation

are essential to the future well-being of this

not contrary to the conservation and use of

state."

ground water, and is not otherwise detri

Neb.Rev.SUt. § 46-601 (Reissue

mental to the public welfare," and if the

1978), and enacted statutes requiring well
registration, well-spacing, and filling of
abandoned wells. Neb.Rev.Stat. §§ 46-602

providing

and 46-609 (Reissue 1978).

from that state into Nebraska.

receiving state "grants reciprocal rights"

K-12

for

transfer

of

ground

water

618

Neb.
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[3] The parties concede that Colorado
forbids the transfer of ground water out
side its borders and has no reciprocity provi
sion in its statute. Neither the courts nor
the Legislature of Nebraska have con
sidered Nebraska ground water as an arti
cle of commerce. Free transfer and ex
change of ground water in a market setting
have never been permitted in this state,
since the water itself is publicly owned.
The public, through legislative action, may
grant to private persons the right to the use
of publicly owned waters for private pur
pose; but as the Olson opinion demon
strates, with its emphasis on sharing in
times of shortage, the public may limit or
deny the right of private parties to freely
use the water when it determines that the
welfare of the state and its citizens is at
stake. Even where it appears that water
itself is being marketed, as in municipal
water supply arrangements, it is the value
of the cost of distributing the water that is
the basis of the rate structure and not the
value of the water itself. See A'. S. B.
Tech. Sales v. North Jersey Dist. Water
Supply, 75 N.J. 272, 381 A.2d 774 (1977).
Appellants in their brief place great re
liance on the case of City of Altus, Oklaho

ma v. Carr, 255 F.Supp. 828 (W.D.Tex.1966),
affd per curiam 385 U.S. 35, 87 S.Ct. 240,
17 L.Ed.2d 34 (1966), which held that a
Texas statute forbidding interstate trans
fers of water without legislative permission
placed an unconstitutional burden on inter
state commerce. However, at the time of
Altus, Texas law treated

ground

much differently than Nebraska.

water
Texas

recognized the absolute ownership of sub
terranean water in the overlying landown
er. This is in sharp contrast to the narrow
ly circumscribed right of reasonable use
only on the overlying land recognized in
Nebraska. In addition, the Altus court not
ed that, in Texas, "after the water has been

Texas . .. recognizes water that has been
withdrawn from underground sources as
personal property subject to sale and com
merce ..." Id. at 840. Since the onlv
transfers prohibited by Texas law were in*,
terstate transfers, Altus found that Texas
considered ground water to be an article of
commerce, subject to the commands of the

commerce clause of the U.S. Constitution
However, intrastate transfers of ground
water in Nebraska are permitted only un
der carefully prescribed conditions and do
not resemble
a free-market setting.
Ground water use is not an unlimited pri
vate property right in Nebraska law.

The

decision in Altus is not controlling. Ne
braska ground water is not an article of
commerce and thus not subject to the stric
tures of the commerce clause.

Since the Altus case was affirmed with
out opinion by the U.S. Supreme Court, we
must assume that the high court had no

quarrel with the District Court's application
of the law to the particular facts of Ahus.
However, we need not and do not assume,

as appellants would have us do, that Altus

"overruled sub sitenth" the 70-year-old
holding in Hudson Water Co. v. McCarter,
209 U.S. 349, 28 S.Ct. 529, 52 L.Ed. 828
(1908), that a state may, under its police
power, forbid or condition the interstate
transfer of its water resources without run
ning afoul of the commerce clause.

The

Hudson case upheld the constitutionality of

a New Jersey statute prohibiting the trans
fer of New Jersey surface water out of the
state. The court noted that "[a] man can
not acquire a right to property by his desire
to use it in commerce among the States,"
and emphasized that the state as "quasi

-sovereign and representative of the inter
ests of the public has a standing in court to
protect the atmosphere, the water and the

forests within its territory, irrespective of

appropriated, the landowner, his lessee or

the assent or dissent of the private owners

assign, has the right to sell the water to

of

others for use off of the land and outside

cerned .... It finds itself in possession of
what all admit to be a great public good,

the basin where produced, just as he could
sell any other species of property." Id. 255
F.Supp. at 840.
In sum, said the Altus
court, "the general law of the

State of

the

land

most

immediately

con

and what it has it may keep and give no one

a reason for its will."
S.Ct. at 531 32.
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Id. at 355-57, 2?

STATE EX REL. DOUGLAS v. SPORHASE
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[4] There have been other U.S. Supreme
Court caaea limiting the rights of individual
states to put conditions on the interstate
transfer of natural resources other than
water, such as natural gas and minnows.
penna v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 43

S.Ct 658, 67 L.Ed. 1117 (1923); Oklahoma
v. Kansas Nat Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229, 31
S.CL 564, 55 LEd. 716 (1911); Hughes v.
Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 99 S.Ct. 1727, 60
L.Ed.2d 250 (1979).

However, we note that
the natural resources dealt with in those
cases have historically been market items,
reducible to private possession and freely

exchangeable for value. This has never
been the case with underground water in
Nebraska. Further, since water is the only
natural resource absolutely essential to hu
man survival, the application of rules de
signed to facilitate commerce in less essen
tial resources to the transfer of water must

be done, if at all, with extreme caution.

It

is this caution which prevents us from hold
ing that Nebraska ground water is an arti
cle of commerce.
Because the ground
water in this case is not an article of com
merce, the commerce clause considerations
do not apply to the Nebraska statute at

[6, 7]

619

Nor does the reciprocity provision

of § 46-613.01 violate constitutional guar
antees of due process, as appellants claim,

by delegating legislative authority to the

legislature of another state.

The Nebraska
Legislature has exercised its legislative au
thority by determining the public policy of
the state with regard to ground water and
enacting that determination into law. It
has not delegated to any other state's legis
lature the right to determine Nebraska pub
lic policy.
The reciprocity provision is
merely one of several conditions to be satis
fied before a permit to transport water out
of state may be granted. As stated in
Lennox v. Housing Authority of City of
Omaha, 137 Neb. 582, 590, 290 N.W. 451,
457 (1940): "The providing of such contin
gencies upon which the law might properly

be limited to take effect does not constitute
a delegation of legislative power. The ap
plicable rule is: The legislature cannot dele
gate its powers to make a law, but it can

make a law to become operative on the
happening of a certain contingency or on an
ascertainment of a fact upon which the law
intends to make its own action depend."

issue here.

[5] Appellants also urge that § 46-613.01 violates the due process provisions of the
fifth and fourteenth amendments to the
Constitution of the United States, which
prohibit the United States or an individual

state from depriving an individual of life,
liberty, or property without due process of
law. Although the arguments in the "due
process" section of appellants' brief are ac
tually equal protection arguments, we note
that conditioning a landowner's right to
transfer ground water either within or
without Nebraska does not deprive him of a
property right, since, under Nebraska com
mon law, ground water may not be trans
ferred off the overlying Nebraska land at
all unless the public, owners of the water,
grant that right Not being at liberty to
transport ground water without public con
sent and having no private property right

in the water itself, appellants are deprived
of neither liberty nor property by § 46-613.-

01.

[8]

In State v. PadJey, 195 Neb. 358, 237

N.W.2d 883 (1976), the statute at issue set a
55-mile-per-hour speed limit on the portion

of Interstate 80 crossing Nebraska, but de

clared that when the President terminates
the Emergency Highway Energy Conserva
tion Act such speed limit will revert to 75
miles per hour. The P&dley court held that:
"In so doing the Legislature has not dele
gated its power to make the law but has
designed its alternative provision to become
effective on the happening of a certain con
tingency." Id. at 360, 237 N.W.2d at 885.
That court also stated that the rule set out
in Lennox "is a well-recognized rule of
law." Id. at 360, 237 N.WJ>d at 885. The
granting of a permit to transport water for
irrigation out of state is contingent upon,
among other things, the receiving state
granting its landowners the same right.
Each state is free to determine its own
public policy with regard to ground water
transfers and to condition the right to

K-14
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620
transfer on

one

or

more

contingencies.

Thus, there has been no unconstitutional
delegation of legislative power by the Ne
braska Legislature.

19] Appellants finally argue that § 46613.01 violates the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment to the U.S.
Constitution by virtue of an unreasonable
classification.

The class upon which § 46-

613.01 operates consists of those persons

wishing

to

transport

Nebraska

ground

water out of state for irrigation purposes.

It is plain from the language of the statute
that the classification is reasonable.

It is

related to a legitimate state interest in pre

serving, for the beneficial use of its citizens,
Nebraska's underground water supply, and

it operates equally on all members of the
class.

Any

person

wishing to

transport

ground water out of state for irrigation
purposes must apply for a permit to do so
and the director of the Nebraska Depart
ment of Water Resources is to use the same
/

guidelines in every instance in determining

whether or not the permit may issue.

That

the statute does not apply to irrigators who
do not wish to transport ground water out

of state hardly makes it violative of equal
protection.
The judgment of the District Court is
affirmed.

does not grant reciprocity ia an unreason
able classification and violates both the
Constitution of the United States and the
Constitution of the State of Nebraska.
Were the statute in question to provide
that no person, firm, city, village, municipal
corporation, or any other entity, including a
citizen of the State of Nebraska, could use
water from this state on land owned bv
such entity in both this state and an adjoin
ing state unless and until the Director of
Water Resources found that the water re
quest was reasonable, was not contrary to

the conservation and use of ground water,
and was not otherwise detrimental to the

public welfare, I would have no difficulty
with the statute. But the statute as it
currently exists provides that even though
the director might find that the request is
reasonable and that to deny it would be
unreasonable, that the request is not con
trary to the conservation and use of ground
water in this state and, to the contrary, is in
furtherance of the conservation and use of
ground water in this state, and that it is not

otherwise detrimental to the public welfare,

but in fact is beneficial to the public wel
fare, he, nevertheless, cannot issue such
permit, solely on the basis that the adjoin
ing state does not permit entities, including
its own citizens, to transport water into this
state.

AFFIRMED.
KRIVOSHA, Chief Justice, concurring in
part, and in part dissenting.

While I generally concur with the majori
ty's conclusion that establishing legislative
criteria to control the transfer of water
from the State of Nebraska to an adjoining

The issue here is not whether reciprocal
legislation is constitutional, but whether a
citizen of the State of Nebraska can be
prohibited from using water on land owned

state is not a violation of the commerce

by that citizen in both this state and in an
adjoining state solely on the basis that the
adjoining state would not reciprocate. If
one were to extend this statute to its logical
conclusion, one could find that even though

clause of the U.S. Constitution, I must re

there was an abundance of water in an area

spectfully dissent from that portion of the

in Nebraska, so much so that flooding was
imminent, the water could not be transfer

majority's

opinion

which

holds

that

the

statutory prohibition against the issuance

red to adjoining land because the adjoining

of the permit, if the adjoining state does

state refused to grant reciprocity.

not grant reciprocity, is a constitutionally
valid act of the Legislature. I believe thai
that portion of Neb.Rev.Stat. § 46-613.01
(Reissue 1978) which prohibits the Director
of Water Resources from issuing a permit
solely on the basis that the adjoining state

It occurs

to me that what this statute attempts to do

is to absolutely prohibit the transfer of

water, without regard to its need or availa
bility, based solely upon the acts of another
state over which citizens of this state have
no control.
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STATE of Nebraska ex rel. Paul L.
DOUGLAS, Attorney

General, Appellee,
v.

Joy SPORHASE et al.f Appellants.
No. 43206.

Supreme Court of Nebraska.
May 8, 1981.

Slave brought suit to enjoin defendants
from transporting Nebraska ground water

into Colorado without a permit. The Dis
trict Court, Chase County, Jack H. Hendrix,
J., issued an injunction and the defendants
appealed. The Supreme Court, White, J.,
held that: (1) commerce clause of United
States Constitution was not violated by Ne
braska statute conditioning transfer of Ne
braska ground water across state line on
receipt of permit from director of Depart
ment of Water Resources who may grant
permit if transfer is reasonable, is not con-

trary to conservation and use of ground
water and is not otherwise detrimental to
public welfare, and if receiving state grants
reciprocal rights, and (2) statutory provision
conditioning transfer of Nebraska ground
water across state line on receiving state's

granting reciprocal rights does not violate
constitutional guarantees of due process on
theory that it delegates legislative authori
ty to legislature of another state.
Affirmed.

Krivosha, C. J.t concurred in part and
dissented in part and filed opinion.
Peter E. Schoon, Jr. and George M. Zeilinger of Padley & Dudden, P. C, Ogallala,
for appellants.

Steven C. Smith, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., of
Van Steenberg, Brower, Chaloupka, Mullin

& Holyoke, Gering, for appellee.

WHITE, Justice.

Apjxjllants own adjacent tracts of land in
Chase County, Nebraska, and in Phillips
County, Colorado. A well physically loca^
ed on the Nebraska tract pumps ground
water for the purpose of irrigating crops on
both the Nebraska tract and the Colorado
tract. Defendants' predecessor in title reg.

istered the well with the State of Nebraska
on January 18, 1971, as required by Neb.

Rev.Stat. § 46-602 (Reissue 1978). How^

ever, neither the defendants nor their
predecessor in title applied to the Nebraska
Department of Water Resources for a per
mit to transport ground water from the
Nebraska well across the border into Colorado as required by Neb.Rev.Stat. § 4&613.01 (Reissue 1978).
The State of Nebraska brought this ac
tion in the District Court of Chase County
to enjoin defendants from transporting Ne
braska ground water into Colorado without
a permit. After trial on the merits, the
District Court issued the injunction, holding
that § 46-613.01 does not violate the com

merce clause of U.S.Const. Art. I, § 8, since
under Nebraska law water is not an article
of commerce. The District Court also held
that even if ground water is an article of

commerce, the statute does not impose an
unreasonable burden of interstate com
merce.

We affirm.

[1, 2] We start our analysis , with the
assumption that if the commerce clause is
to apply to a state statute regulating the
interstate transfer of a commodity, that
commodity must be an "article of com
merce." The term "commerce" implies thai
the commodity must be capable of being
reduced to private possession and then ex
changed for goods or services of the same

or similar economic value.

An analysis of

Nebraska case law and statutes demon
strates that Nebraska law has never con

sidered ground water to be a market item
freely transferable for value among privauparties, and therefore not an article of com
merce.

Heard before KRIVOSHA, C. J., and
BOSLAUGH,
McCOWN,
CLINTON,
BRODKEY, WHITE, and HASTINGS. JJ.

The first Nebraska case to consider the
overlying landowner's proprietary interest

in water under his land is Olson v. City o.
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HUDSON COUNTY
PJff.

WATER COMPANY,

in

Err..

v.

ROBERT H.

McCARTER. .Attorney Gen

eral of the State of New Jersey.

Waters — riparian

rights — diverting

water beyond state.

1. No agreement of private riparian own

ers can
portant

sanction the diversion of an im
stream outside the boundaries of

j the state in which it flows.

Constitutional Jaw — police power —
prohibiting diverting water beyond
state.

2. The police power of the state justifies
"ttre-^uactment of N. J. Laws 1905, chap.
23S, under which a riparian owner may be
prevented from diverting the waters of a
stream of such slate into any other state,
for use therein.

Constitutional law —due process of law
— equal protection of the laws —pro
hibiting:
diverting
water
beyond
state.

3. Neither due process of law nor the
equal protection of the laws is denied by
N. J. Laws 1905, chap. 2.1 S. under which
a riparian owner may be prevented from
diverting the waters of a stream of the
state into any other state, for use therein.
Constitutional
law — impairing
tract obligations.

con

4. The obligation? of a contract to divert
the waters of the Passaic river into an
other state, for use therein, are not uncon
stitutionally impaired by the enactment,
in the exercise of the police power, of N.
J. Laws 1905. chap. 23S, under which such

a diversion of water beyond
forbidden.

the

state is
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for a period of more than twenty-five
years.1
In November, 1964, the City of AHus
entered into a contract with the Mocks
whereby the City of Altus was granted
an option for a period of nine months
within which to purchase a lease for pro

ducing water from subsurface water
bearing
formations
underlying
the
Mocks' land. Then, in December, 1964,

the citizens of the City of Altus voted
to issue §2,000,000.00 in city bonds to
pay for the cost of financing the leas
ing, drilling and transportation of the
water produced from the Mocks' land.
The bonds were issued in May, 1965,
and in the same month the City of Altus
and the Mocks executed a lease whereby
the Mocks granted, demised, leased and
let unto the City of Altus the Mocks'

land for the sole and only purpose of
mining and operating for subsurface
water and for the transportation of such
water to the City of Altus for its use.

Pursuant to this lease, the City of Altus
has to date incurred expenses totaling

approximately $110,720.09 in connection
with the investigating and leasing of the
subsurface water formation underlying
the Mocks' land.
On January 26, 1965, however, Article
7477b was introduced in the House of
Representatives of the State of Texas as
House Bill No. 225 by W. S. Heatly.
Representative Heatly represents District
No. 82, which includes Wilbarger County,

Texas.
The Texas Legislature passed
Article 7477b on May 28, 1965, and ad
journed on May 31, 1965. Unless called
into special session, the Texas Legislature
will not reconvene until 1967. - • •
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ate o» 2S5 F.Supp. R28 (HiOO)

interstate commerce.
H. P. Hood &
Sons v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 69 S.Ct.
657, 93 L.Ed. 865 (1949); The Minneso
ta Rate Cases, 230 U.S. 352, 33 S.Ct. 729,
57 L.Ed. 1511 (1913). In the recent case
of Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City
of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 444,80 S.Ct. 813,
4 L.Ed.2d 852 (1960), an undue or un

reasonable burden was defined as one
which materially affects interstate com
merce where uniformity of regulation is
necessary.

The Plaintiffs contend that Section 2
of Article 7477b constitutes an unreason

able burden

upon interstate commerce
for the reason that it permits the with
drawal and use of underground water

subject to the one and only condition that
such water shall not be transported to

another state. In support thereof, the
Plaintiffs rely upon the cases of Com
monwealth of Pennsylvania v. State of

Commerce Clause

[15,16] By virtue of the Commerce
Clause, the Congress of these United
States was specifically granted the power
to regulate commerce among the several
states, and the states may not unreason
ably burden or interfere with interstate
commerce.

This is not to say that a

state may not, in the absence of con

flicting legislation by

Congress, make

laws governing matters of local concern
which may in some measure affect inter
state commerce, or even, to some extent,
regulate it. Southern Pacific Co. v. State
of Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 767, 65 S.Ct.
1515, 89 L.Ed. 1915 (1945).

Rather, it

means that a state may not enact a law
which imposes a direct burden on inter
state commerce or discriminates against
11.

Stipulation of Facts, section 6, at 5.

12.

Id. at 5-6.

13.

14.

Report oo Water Supply, March 19Q4,
Plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 2, Table 7, shows
that the torn! estimated cost, including
interest oc the debt to be $3,524,000 over
a twenty-fire year amortization period.
The purpose of the Declaratory Judg
ment Ac:. Title 2S. f.S.C. § 2201, was
Buccintly stated in E. Edelmann & Co. v.
Triple-A Specialty Co.. SS F.2d 852, 854

West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 43 S.Ct. 658
(1923) and West v. Kansas Natural Gas
Co., 221 U.S. 229, 31 S.Ct. 564, 55 L.Ed.
716 (1910).

In the case of Commonwealth of Penn
sylvania v. State of West Virginia the
Supreme Court had before it the question
whether a State wherein natural gas is
produced and is a recognized subject of
commercial dealings may enact a statute
which

requires that the consumers

of

such State shall be accorded a preferred
right of purchase over consumers in other

States. In holding the statute in ques
tion an interference with interstate com
merce, the Supreme Court stated:
"The question is an important one;
for what one state may do others may,

and there are 10 states from which nat(7th

Cir. 3937):

"It -was the conpres-

sionnl intent to avoid accrual of avoidable

damnfres to one not certain of his rights
and to afford him

an early adjudication

■without waiting until his adversary should

Bee fit to begin suit, after damage
accrued." Accord: Luekenbach S. S.
v. Tniied States. 312 F.2rt 545 (2d
3D(k>>; Muskogon Piston I»ing Co. v.

had
Co.
Cir.
01-

Fen. 307 F.2d 85 (6tb Cir. 19G2), cert,
denied 371 T.S. 952. S3 S.Ct. 50S. 9 L.
Ed.2d 500: Shell Oil Co. v. Fruserta, 280
F.2d GS9 (9th Cir. 2961).
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Commerce — state

lilMtlng

Interference — j>ro-

diverting

WMler

l«\\ond

FtlllC.

5. Commerce between the stales of New
York and New Jersey is not unlawfully in

After the pansage of this

Ptatuti- the defendant made a contract with
tbe city of New York to furnish a supply
of water adequate for the boroush of Rich
mond, and of not leas than 2,000,000 gal

be forbidden to divert the waters of tin*
Passaic river beyond the state, under a
contract to furnish a water supply for the
city of New York.

brought, praying that, pursuant to tbe
abo\e act and otherwise, the defendant

Constitutional luw — privileges and im-

arc allegations as to the amount of water
and the probable future demand, upon which
the parties arc not wholly agreed, hut the
essential facts are not denied. The defend
ant sets up that the statute, if applicable
to it, is contrary to the Constitution of the

under

which

a

riparian

xnnnilics — forbidding

owner

nun-

diverting

wu-

ter beyond slate.

C. Privileges of citizens of New Jersey
are not denied to the citizens of other stale*

by N. J. Laws 1905, chap. 23S. under which
a* riparian owner may be prevented from
di\ erring the waters of a stream of that

6tate into any other Btate, for use therein.
[No. 184.]

Argued March 18, 19, 1908.
6,

Decided April

1908.

IN TT.TiOR to the Court of Errors and
Appeals of the State of New Jersey to

review a decree which affirmed a decree of
the Court

of Chancery

of

that state,

en

joining the diversion of the water of the
Pa<=<=ak- river under a contract to furni«h
a water surply for the city of New York.
Affirmed.

See saroe case below. 70 N. J. Eq. 695,

G5 Ail. 4F9.

The fact? are stated in the opinion.

M<?8srs. Gilbert Collins and Richard V.
Lindnlmry for plaintiff in error.
Mr. Robert H. MeCarier for defendant
in error.

Mr. Justice Holmes: delivered the opin
ion of the court:

lons u day.

Thereupon this information waa

might be enjoined from carrying the waters

of the Passaic river out of the ptatt.

There

Vnited States, that it impairs the obliga
tion of contracts, takes property without
due process of Jaw, interferes with com

merce between New Jersey and New York,
denies the privileges of citizens of New Jer
sey to citizens of other states, and denies to
them the equal protection of the laws. An
injunction was issued by the chancellor ("0
N. J. Eq. 525. Cl All. 710), tbe decree was
affirmed by the court oj errors and appeals

(70 N. J.' Eq. 695, 65 Atl. 489), and the

ca<-e then was brought here.
The courts below assumed or decided, and
we shall assume, that the defendant repre

sents the rights of a riparian proprietor:
and. on the other band, that it represents
no special chartered powers that give it
greater rightB than those.
On these as
sumptions the court of errors and appeal*
pointed out that a riparian proprietor has
no right to divert waters for more than a
reasonable distance from the body of the
stream or for other than the well-known
ordinary

uses,

and

that

for

any

pur

pose anywhere he is narrowly limited in
amnmt. It went on to infer that his only
ri'-'i.: in the body of the strtam is to have

This is an information alleging that the
defendant (the plaintiff in error"i. under a ! the flow continue, and that thf-re i? a residcontract with the city of Bayonne. in New ] uum of public ownership in the state.
It
Jersey, has laid mains in that city for the '. reinforced the state's right? by the state?
purpose of carrying water to Staten island. : title to the bed of the stream where flowed
in the state of New York.
By other con
by the tide, and concluded from the fore
tracts it is to pet the water from the Pas- going and other considerations that, as
saie river, at Little Falls, where the East against the rights of riparian owners merely
Jersey Water Company has a large plant as such, the state was warranted in pro
by which the water is withdrawn. On Mny hibiting the acquisition of the title to water
11, 1W5. the state of New Jersey, reciting on a larger scale.
the need of preserving the fresh water of
We will not say that the considerations
tbe state for the health and prosperity of that we have stated do not warrant the
thf citizens, enacted

that "it shall be un

lawful for any person or corporation to
transport or carry, through pinos. conduits,
di:c!ir:>. or canals, tbe waters of any fresh

w.itcr lake. ]«oiid. brook, creek, river, or
strram of tVi? «-;au- into any oilier =tnte.
jf

chap. '23b. p. 4GJ.

terfered with by N* J. Lnws ]i»05, chap.
238,

. f

Oct.
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for u?e tilt-rein.'*

By

a

second

srction

conclusion

reached;

and

we

shall

tempt to revise the opinion of

not

at

the local

court upon the local law. if. for the purpose

of drei-ion. we accept the argument of the
plain*if in error that it is o>t. to revision

I when eon«".iiutional right* are set up.

Nei-

a I ihi-r shall we consider whether such a *'»ai-

proo*"iiinc like the present was authorized. ! me as the one before us might not be upin order to enforce tbe act.

Laws of IOC'S.

' held, even if the lower riparian proprietors
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were the absolute owii'-t* of (If

efn-aiii, on tin* ground thnt jl

nutiiori/.i-d n

suit by the plate in their infereM, wIitc it
dora not appear Dial ihey all hnv<« rele;jM-<l

tiioir rights.

Sec Kansas v. Colorado, )B5
U. 8. 125. 142, 4G L. ed. 836, S44, 22 Sup.
Ct. Rep. 552.
But we pref.-r to put the
authority, which cannot !><■

denied

to the

state, upon a broader ground than that
which was emphasized helnw. Bince, in our
opinion, it is jiid«-K'rHi-nt

of tin-

more or

Jess attenuated residuum of title that the
etatt may be eaid to pus-ess.
All rights tend to declare themselves ab
solute to their logical extreme.
Yet all in

fact arc limited by tin- neighborhood of
principles of policy which ar* oilier than
those on which the particular right is found
ed, and which become- strong enough to hold
their own when a certain point is reached.
Tin* limits set to property by other public
interests present themselves as a branch of

■what is called the police power of the state.
The boundary at which the conf.icting inter
ests balance cannot be determined by any
gc-nc-ral formula in advance, but points in
the line, or helping to establish it, are fixed
by decisions that this or that concrete case

falls on the nearer or farther side. For in
stance, tlie police power mar limit the
height of buildings in a city, without com
pensation.
To that extent it cuts down
what otherwise would be the rights of propeny. But if it should attempt to limit the
height so far as to make an ordinary build

ing lot wholly useless, the rights of prop
erty would prevail over the other public
interest, and the police power would fail.

To set such a limit would need compensa
tion and the power of eminent d'main.
/ It sometimes is difficult to fix boundary
stones between the private right of property
and the police power when, as in the case
at bar, we know of few decisions that are
very much in point. But it is recognized
that the state, as quasi-sovereign and repre
sentative of the interests of the public, has
a standing in court to protect the atmos
phere, the water, and the forests within its
territory, irrespective of the a^ent or dis

sent of the private owners of the land most
immediately concerned.
Kansas r. Colora

do, 185 U.'S. 125, 141, 142. 46 L. ed. 83S,

844. 645, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 552, s. C. 20C

TJ. S. 40. 0?. 51 L. ed. P50, 975, 27 Sup. Ct.
Rez>. C55; Georeia v. Tennessee Copper Co.

20ii U. S. 230. 23S. 51 L. ed. 103S. 1044. 27

Sup. Ct. T.ep. CIS.
What it may protect
by suit in this court from interference in
the name of property outside of tue state's
jurisdiction, one would think thnt it could
protect by statute from interferenre in the
same

name

within.

On

this

principle

of

public interest and the pel ice power, and not

B31

nn-ri ly as the inheritor of a royal prerogativf, thr Rlnt«- may make law* for the pres

ervation of ptnii*. which ncrm

u stronger
cane.
Goer v. Cnuwrtirut, Kil U. S. 51B,
M4, 40 L. cd. 793. 7(»B. Ifi Sup. Ct. Rep.
COO.

T\\<: problems of irrigation have no place
here. Jiving them on one sM<. it ajijwara
to us that few public interest * are more
obvious, indisputable, and independent of
particular theory than the intcr'.-st of the
public of a 9tote to maintain the rivers
that are wholly within it substantially undiminished, except by such draft- u»»on them
as the guardian of the public welfare may
permit for the purjiose of turning them to a

more perfect use.

•

This public interest is

omnipresent wherever there is a state, and

grows more pressing as population grows.
It is fundamental, and we are of opinion
that the private property of riparian pro
prietors cannot be supposed to have deeper
roots. Whether it be said that such an in
terest justifies the cutting down by statute,
without compensation, in the exercise of the
j.olice power, of what otherwise would be
private rights of property, or that, apart
from statute, those rights do not go to the

height of what the defendant seeks to do,
the result is the same.- But we agree with
the Xew Jersey courts, and think it quite
beyond any rational view of riparian rights,
that an agreement, of no matter what pri
vate owners, could sanction the diversion
of an important stream outside the bound
aries of the state in which it flowB.
The
private right to appropriate is subject not
only to the rights of lower owners, but to
the initial limitation that it may not sub
stantially diminish one of the great foun
dations of public welfare and health.
We are of opinion, further, that the con
stitutional power of the state to insist taat
its natural advantages shall remain unim
paired by its citizens is not dependent upon
any nice estimate of the extent of present
use or speculation as to future needs. The
legal conception of the necessary is apt to
be confined to somewhat rudimentary wants,
and there are benefits from a great river
that might escape a lawyer's view.
But
the state is not required to submit even to
an aesthetic analysis. Any analysis may be
inadequate.

It fiuds itself in possession of

what all admit to be a great public good,
and what it has it may keep and give no
one a reason for its will.

■ " -

The defense under the I4th Amendment
is disposed of by what we have said. That
under article 1, § 10, needs but a few words
more. One whose rights, such as they are,*
are subject to stale restriction, cannot re
move them from the power of the state by
making a contract about then:.
Tin- con-
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tract will carry with it the infirmity of the
•ulijcftmattrr.
Kno\vill» Wnicr Co. v.
Kiioxvillt, 180 U. S- 43-J, 438, 47 L. ed.
8S7. 892, 23 Suy.. Cl. TW> 531 ; Manipault
v. Spring, ]'Jfl U. S. 473, 480, SO L. ed. 274,
278. 2G Sup. Ct. Rep. 127.
But the contiar-i, the- execution of which h nought to be
prevented here, was illegal when it was

The other defenses also may receive short
answers. A man cannot acquire a ripht to
property by his desire to use it in commerce
amonp the states.
Neither can he enlarge

bis otherwise limited and qualified ripht to
the same end. The case is covered in this
resjiect by Geer t. Connecticut, 1C1 U. S.
519, 40 L. ed. 793, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 000.
and the same decision disposes of the argu
ment that the New Jersey law denies equal

privileges to the citizens of New York./ It
constantly is necessary to reconcile and to
adjust

different constitutional principles,
each of which would be entitled to posses
sion of the disputed ground but for the

presence of the others. a= we already have
said that it is necessary to reconcile and to
c(.";u^t diCereu: }Tiri'ip!>- of the common law.,

s..<- Asi.«-ii v. k«!j<i- :j'«r» i". s. lir.i. ra l.
'•J. —. 2S Sup. Ci. ll-;-. JS."l.v Tin- rigL: to
receive water from a river through pipes is
subject to territorial limit; by nature, and

those limits may be fixed by the siaie within which the river flows, even if they are
made to coincide with the state line..' With
in the boundary, citizens of New York are
as free to purchase- as citizens of New- Jer

sey. But this question does not concern the
defendant, which is a New Jersey corpora
tion. There is nothing else that needs men

tion. We are of opinion that the decision
of the Court of Errors and Appeals was
rijrht.
Dt-cret affirmed.
Mr. Justice McKenna dissents.
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(Oct. Term,

of the United States, tbe Supreme Court hop
jurisdiction of an appeal from tbe decree, un
der Judicial Code, § 128 (Comp. St. £ 3120),

thoupb tbe Circuit Court of Appeals did sot
base

itB

decree

on

tbe

constitutional

ricbt

claimed, unless the claim was so unsubstantial
as to be frivolous.

2. Courts C=s382(5)—Decision of right to use
of interstate stream held based on constitu
tional grounds.
Where tbe defendant in a suit to reptrain
a

its

Ftnte

ripbt

state

ojjgiuevr

from

depriving

plaintiff

to take waters diverted within

across

the

state boundary,

claimed

of

tbe
tbt

ripbt to prevent such takiig on tbe prouud tbe
rifht to tbe water within tbe state was vested
in the people of tbe slate under tbe state Con
stitution, which claim was denied by tbe lower
fourts. the decision was not based on tbe laws
of either state, but on rights in tbe interstate
stream secured by the Constitution of tbe Unit

ed States, bo thai an appeal lies to tbe Supreme

Court under Judicial Code, § 12S (Comp. St.

8 1120).

Appeal from tbe United States Circuit
Court of Appeals for tbe Eighth Circuit.

Suit by

tbe Pioneer Irrigation

Company

.'ic.iir.st A<!ell*rt A. Weiland. as State Engiut-er of tlip State of Colorado, and others.
1 iferee for tbe plaintiff was affirmed by the

Circuit Court of Appeals (151 C. C. A. 4"m.
-?>b Fi-d. ,p»19i. and defendant;? appeal.
M«tion to dismiss tbe appeal denied, and decrt-e affirmed.

|
•Messrs. Delph E. Carpenter, of Greeley.
| Colo., and Victor E. Keyes, Fred Farrar, and
, Leslie E. Hubbard, all of Denver. Colo., for
ap) teHants.

Mr. Edwin H. Park, of Denver, Colo., for
appellee.

Mr. Justice CLARKE delivered the opin
ion of the Court.
The appellants, defendants below, are citi
zens and offk-ers of tbe state of Colorado,
charged vritb official duties wiib resi>ect to
tbe distribution of water from streams of
that state for irrigating purposes, and other
citizens of Colorado, who need not be further
noiiced.
The appellee, plaintiff below, a corporation

organized uiicer Nebraska laws, is the owner
of an irrijr.iting canal b7 which it has di
verted water from the North fork of the
Republican river, an interstate stream, at n
point about G miles west of tbe east line of

■ 2f* r. S. «si

WEILAND. State^Eisjjineer^of Colorado, et ai.
v.

PIONEER

IRR.

CO.

(Re argued Jututry 30. 11. V.<22.

Cojorado.

Since lSf«O one-third of the water

Ilius obtained

has l*ea

sold

Hud

used on

Inud* in Colorado, mid the rcmaininp twotliirds carried by the canal into Nebraska

Decided

has been used on lanes in that suite.
No. 3.

This suit was comirenced in 391o, in the

I. Courts C=>382(5)—Federal question in bill
gives jurisdiction on appeal, unless it is
frivolous.
Where tbe bil] sufficiently sets up a ques

tion arifinr under the -Coiisiituiion and laws'
OLLer case? spe

District Court of the United States for the
District of Colorado.
Tbe bill of complaint
is not printed in full in the record, but tbe
cj-iii'jne of it shows that, iu addition to divorsiry of citizenship :is a basis of .iurisdk*-

lojuc aud KEV-NCMBEr. Id all Key.Numbered Digesu and lDdeies

K-24
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TTETI,A?Oi v.riONT.nR IRK. CO.
'42 SujiCt.)

tlon. !l was averred that th-- rich! of npj<ellce,
tinder the Constitution of 1ho Unifed States
to on-vise in commerce between the states of
Colorado and Nebraska, hy trauKjiortiJijr
wuter from the former inio tin- latter und
then- soiling it for uprk-nlturnl and domestic
purjKisc-E.

was

being

seriously

impaired

by

zonsliJp. nevertheless both the district C"urt
and the Circuit Courl of Appeals sustained
apTHlfp'p ijF<- and

in

Nebraska

and the use hy other? subsequent in right, to
a valid appropriation by the appellee. There
■was also a general allegation that rirhts of
a pi-el lee secured to it by the Constitution
and laws of the United Slates had been in

vaded by tbe action of tbe appellant officials.
A decree permanently enjoining this alleged

of

the writer

of prescriptive

richt. derived from 20 yars of undisputed
use. and not ujron nny federal constitutional
ground, aud that therefore the jurisdiction

the unconstitutional conduct of the state of- exercised
ficialF of-Colorado, *in permitting, under color
of the laws of that state, the wasteful «<••- pf
the water hy appropriators prior in risht,

disposition

as one morely

rested

wholly

upon

diversity

of

ip. aud »u appeal doe= not lie from

the decision of tbe Circuit Court of Appenls
uuder section 12S of the Judicial Code (Com-p.
.St. f l]20).
The {rround of federal juried?ction. other
than diversity of citizenship, being sufficient

ly set up in the bill, pucb a motion to dis
miss can prevail only if thv claim is so un
substantial as to be frivolous.
Shulthis v.

McDougnl. 225 U. S. PCI, Z'J Sup. Ct. 704, 50
L. Ed. 1205: I^vell. Trusiee v. Newman &
unconstitutional action by the state officers
Son. 227 U. S. 412. 120. SO Sup. Ct. 375. 57
was prayed for.
L. Ed. 577.
But such clearly was not tbe
In its decree tbe District Court found that
fact in this case,
there existed tbe requisite diversity of citi[2] It is entirely clear that tbe essential
7-enshjp to give the court jurisdiction, and
also that the "suit was brought to obtain
redress

for

the

deprivation

by

defendants

[appellants] of rights and privileges secured

and substanti.il issue in tbe c^se arose from
the insertion by the sp:-eliee of the federal
constitutional rijrht to transport water, deriv-

to the plaintiff [appellee] bv the Constitution ^d *rom an interstate stream, from Colorado
and laws of the United Zx&us.» and that, 3nto ***«iska under its pnonry of apprc-

therefore it was a suit arisiujj under the I1."?00" as of 1S'90- arjd tbe d'JDial of th]"
/

laws of the United States. The court found claim b-T the aPPe"ant state olhcers, based
that the carrying capacitv of appellees diich j urx)n tLe conteDtion that water in natural

at the Nebraska state line was -9 cubic fe?t! U){emate breams in Coloraau. having been

of water per second, that since the date of ^clnred by tbe Constitution and laws of

tbe construction of tbe ditch in 1890 that *h« state t0 be ^ Property of tbe public,

amount of water had been put to beneficial j dedicated to the use of tbe peo^e of Colorause in the irrigation of kinds within the state : do> the n?ht could DOt be obtained by ap-

nf Nebraska, and that by reason of such con- proi,riat5oD a]cd

xuiued beneficial use there hnd 1-ecome vested
3d the appellee a property right to tbe con
tinued use thereof.
The Colorado officials,
and their successors in office were enjoined

•'from interfering with the right of plaintiff

'f

tuse, to carry such

water into an adjoining state for like use.
as against persons desiring to use it in Colo
rado, even though junior in point of date of

appropriation.

Both lower courts denied this

contention of the state officials, appellants,

fappeltee) to eaid water as herein adjudged
and enjoined them- from treating the appellee
and
•
•
• from treating plaintiff in the
in the distribution of water otherwise than
distribution of water • * • otherwise than
as if the state line had not existed, and the

it would be treated if said canal were whol
! land irrigated had been wholly within tbe
ly within the siate of Colorado and all lands
state of Colorado.
It is thu? plain that tbe
irrigated therefrom were in said state.."
decree appealed front- necessarily rested, not
The court declined to consiuer the question
upon Colorado laws or decisions which at
of the wasteful or other use of the water by
tempted to deny the asserted right to the
<>:licr ajipropriators in Colorado, and. confin
ing its decree to tbe one point dealt with in use of tbe water in Nebraska, nor upon
The injunction, expressly left open for con Nebraska laws or decisions which could not
•r>oj

sideration

and

determination in another
proceeding all other issues joined under the
plea dings.

,

be effective in Colorado, but upon rights se
cured to the appellee by tbe Constitution

of the United States.

This substantial and

very fundamental question being in tbe case.

The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the

aud

e?sential

to

tbe

which

was

decree of the District Court, and on the con-; made of it, the motion to dismiss must be
testion that a constitutional question is in-■ overruled,
velved the case is brought here for review.
As to the merits of the case:
In the disThe appellee filed n motion in this court i cussion of the .iurisdictioual question ir has

to dismiss or afiiria. which was passed to ' been sufficiently develoj>ed tbr.t ih-r essential

hearing on the merits.

j controversy here involved is whether priority

11 j In supjtort of the'motion to dismiss it' of appropriation of water, from the part of
is argued that, although jurisdiction was in- j an interstate stream in Colorado, for benevnked in tbe bill on sufb-.ie:i:Jy ^lVst'il led- ! noinl use on lands in Nebraska, into whicL

er:;l grounds, in :ii2'Ji;u>i> to diversity of citi-j state Uie sire.inr in a siate of ua:ure n\nv&.

K-25

r,70

42 si:ri:i:Mn coujjt w:i*oirn:it
Biiprrinrlij- of rlslit over Infer appro

priation

nlso inude

in

Colorudo

from

tbe

sumo stream, but for use Id that Rtate.

Both of the lower courts bold that the
presence of the- state line did not affect tbe
superiority <if ri^ht nnd enjoined the Colo
rado rtflte officials from treating the aiij»fllce
in the distribution of wnter otherwise thnn

it would lit* trcjited if tbp <'nunl were wholly |
within

the stnte of Colorado nnd

all

the*!

liinds irripnti'd therefrom were in that sttite.
The question thu.« presented is bo fully diP-|

loosed of ou principle and authority in the |

opinion of the court this day announced in i
No. ii orisinssl, State of Wyoming v. Slate
•r»n:t

of Colorado et al., "259 L*. S. ^1^. i'J Sup. Ct.
Ji52. CC L. Ed.
. that further discussion of
it would be superfluous, and upon the au
thority of that decision tbe decree of tbe
Circuit Court of Appeals is
Affirmed.

K-26

<oct. Term,

APPENDIX D

255 FEDERAL SUPPLEMENT

828

closed that he had actually been advised
in these matters by witness, Edward
Dunn, the Congregational Servant. Mr.
Dunn was recognized by the Draft Board
as an ordained minister and presiding

clergyman of Jehovah's Witnesses in that
area.

Clearly, defendant's contention has

no merit.

1. Courts C=>260.4

Generally federal courts will abstain
exercising jurisdiction in case
where state statute is under attack as be
ing violative of United States Constitu
tion until such state statute has been first
construed by courts of that state.
from

2. Courts O=>260.4

[4] Finally, defendant urges that the
Court erred in not dismissing for cause
a prospective juror (stricken by defend
ant), who admitted that he was preju
diced against Jehovah's Witnesses. This
juror was one of four, from which group
two alternates were to be chosen. The
case was a short case and the likelihood
of need of any alternates was slight. No
alternate was needed. The original jury
already picked

decided

the

case.

The

contention is likewise without merit.

The doctrine of abstention is not an
absolute rule to be applied by federal
courts to all cases involving constitution
ality of a state statute which has not
been construed by the state court.
3. Courts 0=260.4

If a state statute is not fairly sub
ject to an interpretation which will avoid
or modify federal constitutional question,
the federal court has a duty to decide the
federal question when presented to it re
gardless of whether state court has con
strued the statute.
4. Waters and Water Courses C=131

Under

O ! Ml KUMBIR itJHM>

Texas

law,

landowner has

right to drill wells and appropriate water
beneath his land.
5. Courts 0=260.4

Texas
CITY OF ALTUS, OKLAHOMA, et al.
v.

Wagoner CARR.

Civ. A. No. 1580.
United States District Court
W. D. Texas,
Austin Division.

others for declaration that a Texas stat

Federal

Constitution.

The three-judge District Court, Suttle,
District Judge, held that Texas statute
prohibiting, without legislative

permis

sion, the removal of water from under

ground source in Texas for use in another
state constitutes an unconstitutional bur
den upon interstate commerce.

Belief prayed for granted and judg
ment accordingly.

without

state for use outside state was clear and
unambiguous in meaning, and since under
no reasonable construction could the con
stitutional issue be avoided federal court
would not abstain from exercising juris

diction in action to declare statute vio
of Federal
Constitution
even
though Texas court had not construed it.
Vernon's Ann.Civ.St.Tex. art. 7477b, § 2.

Suit by Oklahoma municipality and
the

forbidding,

lative

May 6, 1966.

ute violated

statute

legislative permission, the withdrawing
of water from an underground source in

6. Courts 0=260.4

Where remedy of landowner under

statute prohibiting the withdrawing of
water, without legislative permission,
from an underground source in Texas for

use outside state was in the nature of a

political

or

special

legislative

remedy

rather than administrative or judicial
remedy, landowners would not be re
quired to exhaust such remedy before
federal court would exercise jurisdiction

in action to declare statute violative of
Federal Constitution.

K-27
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Cite as 255 F.Supp. S2K (1906)

7. Courts O262.4 (2)

Individuals who, as officers of the
state, are clothed with some duty in re
gard to enforcement of laws of state, and
who threaten and are about to commence
proceedings, either of a civil or criminal
nature, to enforce against parties affect
ed an act violating Federal Constitution
may be enjoined by federal court from

such action.

U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 11.'

8. Courts €=303(8)

The fact that a state officer by vir
tue of his office has some connection
with enforcement of the allegedly uncon
stitutional act is the important and ma
terial fact in determining whether suit
to declare act unconstitutional and nam
ing officer is prohibited by the Eleventh
Amendment to the Federal Constitution,

and whether officer's connection arises
out of general law, or is specially created
by the act itself, is not material so long
as it exists.
9. Courts C=303(8)

Texas Attorney General, who was by
virtue of statute specifically granted au
thority to prosecute suits to enforce pro
visions of particular chapter of which

and their suit for declaration of uncon
stitutionally of statute was not prema
ture.
Vernon's Ann.Civ.St.Tex. art.
7477b, § 2; U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 11.
12. Courts 0=303(8)

It is not necessary that state offi
cer, upon whom is duty of enforcing par

ticular state statute attacked as violative
of Federal Constitution, take some af
firmative action to enforce statute so that
suit against state officer in federal court
to declare state statute unconstitutional

be without the Eleventh Amendment, and
if officer can, by declining to act, enforce
statute there is threat enough to take suit
without provisions of the Eleventh
Amendment. U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 11.
13. Courts C=303(8)

Where the very presence of Texas
statute prohibiting the taking of water

from underground souree in Texas for
use elsewhere and the possibility of its
enforcement would preclude Oklahoma
municipality from making further sub
stantial expenditures of tax money nec
essary to obtain and transport water
from Texas land, the presence of statute
and the failure of Texas Attorney Gen

allegedly unconstitutional statute was a
part, had some connection with enforce
ment of statute so that federal court by
taking jurisdiction of suit to declare act
unconstitutional and naming him as a
party was not violative of the Eleventh
Amendment. U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 11.

eral to act constituted sufficient threat
to take case against Attorney General in
federal court to declare statute unconsti
tutional
without
contemplation
of
Eleventh Amendment.
U.S.C.A.Const.

10. Declarators' Judgment C=123

14. Declarator}' Judgment C=24

There must be a realistic fear of
prosecution or a realistic fear or appre

hension that state statute in question will
be enforced against plaintiffs if federal
court action to declare state statute vio

lative of Federal Constitution is not to
be deemed premature.

Purpose of Declaratory Judgment
Act is to avoid accrual of unavoidable
damages to one not certain of his rights
and to afford him an early adjudication
without waiting until his adversary

should see fit to make suit, after damage
had occurred.

11. Declarators' Judgment C=124

Oklahoma municipality and

Amend. 11.

Texas

landowner bringing suit for declaration
of unconstitutionally of Texas statute

28 U.S.C.A. § 2201.

25. Commerce C=5, 48

By virtue of Commerce Clause, Con
gress was specifically granted power to

prohibiting, without legislative permis

regulate

source in Texas for use in another stale

ably burden or interfere with interstate

statute would be enforced against them

cl. 3.

sion, taking of water from underground

had a realistic fear or apprehension that

commerce

among

the

several

states, and the states may not unreason
commerce.

K-28
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made the subject of an independent grant

J6. Commerce C=48

State may, in absence of conflicting
legislation by Congress, make laws gov

erning matters of local concern which
may in some measure affect interstate
commerce, or even, to some extent, regu

late it, but a state may not enact the law
which imposes a direct burden on inter
state commerce or discriminates against
interstate commerce.

U.S.C.A.Const. art.

1, § 8, cl. 3.

of ownership.
21. Waters and Water Courses <3=154(1)

After underground percolating water
has been

appropriated, landowner, hig

tenant or assign, has right to Bell water
to others for use off land and outside
basin where produced, just as he could
sell any other species of property. Ver
non's Ann.Civ.St.Tex. arts. 7477b, § 7,
7880-3c, subd. D.

17. Commerce C=48

The legislative declaration as to pur

pose and intent of statute prohibiting the
removal of water from underground
source in Texas for use outside of state

A. W. Walker, Jr., Ben B. West, Dallas,
Tex., James W. Wilson, McGinnis, Lochridge, Kilgore, Hunter &. Wilson, Austin,

to conserve and protect all water resourc

Tex., for plaintiffs.

es both public and private did not bind
Texas landowner and Oklahoma munici

Hawthorne Phillips, First Asst. Atty.
Gen., J. Arthur Sandlin, Roger Tyler,
Asst. Attys. Gen., of Texas, Austin, Tex.,

pality seeking declaration

that statute
was unconstitutional, and they could show

that statute in its practical operation was
an

unreasonable

burden

on

interstate

commerce. U.S.C.A.Const. art. 1, § 8, cl.
3;

Vernon's Ann.Civ.St.Tex. art. 7477b,

for defendant.

Before THORNBERRY, Circuit Judge,
SPEARS, Chief Judge, District Court,
and SUTTLE, District Judge.

§2.

SUTTLE, District Judge.

18. Commerce O=55

Texas statute prohibiting, without

legislative permission, the removal of waler from underground source in Texas for
use in another state constitutes an un

constitutional

commerce.
3;

burden

upon

interstate

U.S.C.A.Const. art. 1. § 8. cl.

Vernon's Ann.Civ.St.Tex. art. 7477b,

This is a suit for declaratory judgment
decreeing that Section 2 of Article 7477b.
Vernon's Ann.Tex.Civ.St&ts.1 is unconsti
tutional and void as being in violation
of the Commerce Clause - of the "United
States Constitution, and for permaneni

injunction

restraining the enforcemer.t

or execution thereof against these plain

§2.

tiffs.

19. Waters and Water Courses C=1O5

Section 2 of Article 7477b, Vernor.'.Ann.Tex.Civ.Stats. (Supp.1965) reads:

Under Texas

law,

if

a

landowner

"No one shall withdraw water from
any underground source in this State
for use in any other state by drilUnp

drilling well on his own land intercepts

or drains off water from beneath his
neighbor's land, this inconvenience to his
neighbor falls within description of damnum absque injuria and carinot be ground

a well in Texas and transporting the
water outside the boundaries of the
State unless the same be specifically

of an action.

authorized by an Act of the Texaf

20. Waters and Water Courses C= 154(1)

Legislature and thereafter as approved

The right to enter upon land and ap
propriate underground

by it."

percolating wa

After a careful consideration of th?

ters is an interest in real estate which
may be exercised by Texas landowner or

record, briefs and arguments of

I.

2.

#

Sec. 2 of H.B. No. 225. Tex.Acts 1965,
.r.f»;L Lep.. ch. T>6> at 124?>. efrVcrivr Aug.

Article 1. Section 8, Clause 3.
Suites Constitution.
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OITY OF ALTTJ6, OKLAHOMA v. OAR.R
CitcaaStfr.

we are of the opinion the plaintiffs are
entitled to the relief prayed for.

Summary of Stipulated Facts
The Plaintiff, City of Altus, Oklahoma,
js a municipal corporation and

county

seat of Jackson County, Oklahoma, and
plaintiffs, C. F. Mock and Pauline Mock,
are husband and wife and reside in the
City of Altus, Oklahoma. The Defendant
"Waggoner Carr is the Attorney General
of the State of Texas.

The Mocks' land, approximately 6,663
contiguous acres, lying in northern Wil
barger County, Texas, borders the Red

River, the boundary line between Wil
barger County, Texas, and Jackson Coun
ty, Oklahoma, and is some fourteen miles
from the City of Altus, Oklahoma.
proximately

six

Mocks'

is located in

land

square

miles

Ap

of

the

the extreme

northern portion of an area covering ap
proximately

75

square miles known

as

the Odell Sand Hills, under which there

The Plaintiff, City of Altus, has an

is

a

natural

subsurface

water-bearing

annual water allotment of 4,800 acre feet,

formation which contains a high quality

set in 1941. from the W. C. Austin Proj

percolating ground water suitable for mu

ect of the U. S. Bureau of Reclamation.

which cannot be increased as all available

nicipal use. The City of Vernon, Texas,
some 14 miles south of the Mocks' land,
has several wells drawing from this for
mation, the northern-most well being
some four miles south of the southern

water drawn from the Project over and

boundary of the Mock property.

With

above the allotment is committed to other

the exception of the Odell

Hills,

users.

In 1963, the City of Altus used

there is no economically available ground

its entire water allotment, and in 1964

water within a 50-mile radius of either

In recent years, due to a rapid growth in

population,3 there has been an increased
demand upon the available water supply,

Sand

was required to borrow some 700 acre

the City of Altus or the City of Vernon

feet, of its 1965 allotment.

which is of such quality and quantity.

In

December,

1963,

foreseeing

the

problem of water shortage, the City of

Altus retained

make

an

engineering firm to

recommendation?

as to

potential

sources of water that might be economi

S\

With the permission of the Mocks, and

at the request of the City of Altus, a wa
drilling and engineering firm

ter-well
drilled

and

logged

a series of

26 test

hole? on the Mock land during the month

cally developed so as to meet its future

of July, 1964, for the purpose of testing

requirements.

the quantity and quality of the subsur

In its March. 1964, Report,

on Water Supply,4 the engineering firm

face water and determining the cost of

recommended that the City of Altus ac

its production.

quire from

his wife,

ber, 1964,6 the drilling and engineering

Pauline, the subsurface water rights in
and to land owned by them in northern
Wilbarger County. Texas, noting in such

firm recommended that the City of Altus

C.

F.

Mock and

In its report of Septem

develop two well

fields by drilling

13

wells at suggested sites which would have

report that the Attorney General of the

an estimated yearly yield of approximate

State of Texas in December. 1963. ren
dered an opinion that it would be legal
for a Texas property owner to sell water

ly 2100 acre feet.

from his land to an Oklahoma user.5

to serve the needs of the City of Altus

3.

T)m> population of the City of AJtus has
increnBed from 9,735 in 1959 to en esti
mated 23,500 at the present.
Excludinp
Alrus Air Force Base, which from 1900
through 1903 had a constant resident

population

of

5.59?

persons,

the

This combined with

the annual allotment from the W. C. Aus

tin Project is estimated to be sufficient

ply. March 39SJ, pps. 5-8. Plaintiffs' Ex
hibit No. 2.

4.

Report on Water Supply, suprn note 3.

5.

Attorney General"? Opinion C-399, Dec.

20. 39G3.

City

of Altus has had an average annual in
crease in population of 5S9 persons from

Ground Water Survey for City of Altus.
Oklahoma, September 1964, Plaintiffs'

1H")O to

Exhibit No. 3.

3900.

&,

Report on Water Sup-

6.
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be done with one natural product may

deny owners of the natural gas the right
to transport it out of the state. The Su
preme Court, in holding the statute in.

be

are

valid under the Commerce Clause, stated:

several states in which the earth yields
products of great vaiue which are car
ried into other Btates and there used.

"We place our decision on the char
acter and purpose of the Oklahoma
statute. * * * It denies to appel

ural gas is exported for consumption

in

other states.

done with

Besides, what may

others,

and

there

But, notwithstanding the importance

of the question, its solution is not dif
ficult.

The controlling principles have

been settled by many adjudications—

some so closely in point that the dis

cussion here may be relatively brief.

"By the Constitution (article I, § 8,

bidden to the states. The purpose in

den, discriminate against or directly
regulate, interstate commerce or the
right to carry it on. And in all of
these inhibited particulars the statute

this

of Oklahoma offends."

cl. 3) the power to regulate interstate

commerce is expressly committed to
Congress and therefore impliedly for
is to proiect

commercial

inter

course from invidious restraints, to
prevent interference through conflict

/0

lees the lesser right to pass under
* * * or over [the highways] * *.
This discrimination is beyond the pow
er of the state to make. As said by
the circuit court of appeals in the
eighth circuit, no state can by action
or inaction prevent, unreasonably bur

221 U.S. at 262,

31 S.Ct. at 574.

The Defendant, however, contends that

ing or hostile state laws and to insure

Section 2 of Article 7477b is not a burden

uniformity

on or interference with interstate com
merce for two reasons.
First, as evi

in

regulation.

It means

that in the matter of interstate com

merce we are a single nation—one and
the same people. All the states have
assented to it, all are alike bound by
it. and all are equally protected by it.

denced by Section 1 of Article 7477b, the
purpose and intent of Section 2 is to con
serve and protect the water resources of

collect

the State by regulating the withdrawal
of water from underground sources, and,

taxes, comprehensive and necessary as

second, since the statute here in question

that power is, cannot be exerted in a
way which involves a discrimination

operates on and regulates underground
water, which is not the subject of ab

against

solute ownership, it does not affect a
substance which is a subject of com
merce. In support of his second conten
tion, the Defendant asserts the cases of
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. State
of West Virginia and West v. Kansas
Natural Gas Co., relied upon by the
Plaintiffs, are distinguishable from this
C2se, and that the cases of Williams v.

Even their power to lay and

such

commerce.

(citations

omitted)

"Natural gas is a lawful article of
commerce, and its transmission from
one state to another for sale and con

sumption

commerce.

in

the

latter

is

interstate

A state law, whether of the

state where the g2s is produced or that
where it is sold, which by its necessary

operation prevents, obstructs or bur

dens such transmission is a regulation
of interstate commerce—a prohibited
interference."

262

L\S.

at

596,

43

S.Ct at 6d5 (citations omitted)

In "West v. Kansas Natural

Gas Co.,

the Supreme Court had before it an Okla
homa statute which denied the right of
eminent domain and the right to use the

highways of the state for the purpose of
transporting natural gas without the
state.

The effect of the statute was to

City of Wichita, 190 Kan. 317, 374 P.2d
578 (1962) appeal dism. 375 U.S. 7, S4
S.Ct. 46, 11 L.Ed.2d 38, reh. den. 375
U.S. 936, 84 S.Ct. 328, 11 L.Ed.2d 267,
and Knight v. Grimes. 80 S.D. 517, 127
N.W.2d 708 (1964), are controlling.
In regard to the Defendant's first con

tention, we observe the assertion therein
is not a novel one.

This contention wsf

considered in both Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania v. State of West Virginia
and West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co. 3c
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the West case, the State of Oklahoma as
serted that it had the right to conserve,

attempts to do. That power is lodged
elsewhere." 262 U.S. at 598, 43 S.Ct.

or rather the right to reserve, the re
sources of the state for the use of its
inhabitants. In answer thereto, the Su
preme Court stated:

at 665.

"The results of the contention repel
its acceptance. Gas, when reduced to
possession, is a commodity; it belongs
to the owner of the land; and, when

[17]

Also, the fact that Section 1 of

Article 7477b declares that the purpose
and intent of such Article ib "to conserve
and protect all water resources both pub
lic and private" does not bind the Plain
tiffs, and they may show that the statute

in its practical operation is an unreason

reduced to possession, is his individ
ual property, subject to sale by him,

able

snd may be a subject of intrastate com

278 U.S. 1, 10, 49 S.Ct. 1, 73 L.Ed. 147

merce and interstate commerce. The
statute of Oklahoma recognizes it to

(1928).

be a subject of intrastate commerce,

but seeks to prohibit it from being the

subject of interstate

commerce,

and

this is the purpose of its conservation.
In other words, the purpose of its con

servation is in a sense commercial—the
business welfare of the state, as coal
might be, or timber.
Both of these
products might be limited in amount,
and the same consideration of the pub
lic welfare which would confine gas
to the use of the inhabitants of a state
would confine them to the inhabitants

of the state.

If the states have such

power, a singular situation might re

sult.

Pennsylvania might keep its coal,

the Northwest its timber, the mining
states their minerals. And why may
not the products of the field be brought
within the principle ?" 221 U.S. at 255,
31 S.Ct. at 571.

In Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v.

burden

on

interstate

commerce.

Foster Fountain Packing Co. v. Hay del,

The Defendant seeks to support his
position that Section 2 of Article 7477b
is a valid and reasonable exercise of the
police power on the theory that Section 2
acts only upon uncaptured water, which
has no owner, or, if there is an owner,
it is the common property of the State

of Texas.

To support this theory and his

general position that under any view the
statute

is a reasonable exercise of the

police power, the Defendant relies pri
marily upon Greer v. State of Connecti

cut, 161 U.S. 519, 16 S.Ct. 600, 40 L.Ed.
793 (1896) ; Hudson County Water Com
pany v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 28 S.Ct
529,

52 L.Ed. 828

(1908);

Knight v.

Grimes, supra, and Williams v. City of
Wichita, supra.
[18]

In

our

opinion,

none

of

the

above cases presents sufficient authority

for this court to disregard the holdings
of the cases of Commonwealth of Penn

sylvania v. State of West Virginia, and

State of West Virginia, the Supreme
Court again expressed disapproval of

West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., which

this contention, stating:

presented herein. Cor.sidering the stat
ute in question only with regard to wheth

"Another consideration advanced to
the same end is that natural pas is a
natural product of the state and has

are found to be controlling on the issue

er it regulates the transportation and use
of water after it has been withdrawn

become a necessity therein, that the

from a well and becomes personal prop

supply is waning and no longer suffi

erty, such statute constitutes an unrea

cient to satisfy locai needs and be used

sonable burden

abroad, and that the act is therefore a

with interstate commerce.

legitimate measure of conservation in

the facts of this case it appear to us that
Section 2 of Article 7477b does not have
for its purpose, nor does it operate to con
serve water resources of the State of

the interest of the people of the state.
If the situation be as stated, it affords
no ground for the assumption by the
state of the power to regulate inter
state commerce, which is what the act

upon

and

interference
Moreover, on

Texas except in the sense that it does so
for her own benefit to the detriment of
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her sister States as in the case of West
v. Kansas Natural Gas Co.

In the name

of conservation, the statute seeks to pro

hibit interstate shipments of water while
indulging in the substantial discrimina
tion of permitting the unrestricted intrastate production and transportation of
water between points within the State, no
matter how distant; for example, from
Wilbarger County to El Paso County,
Texas. Obviously, the statute had little
relation to the cause of conservation.
[19-21]

Under the law of the State

of Texas, a landowner has the right to
drill wells and appropriate all the under
ground percolating waters found to his
own purposes, and if, in the exercise of
such right, he intercepts or drains off
water from beneath his neighbor's land,
this inconvenience to his neighbor falls

within the description of damnum absque

injuria, which cannot be the ground of
an action.
City of Corpus Christi v.
City of Pleasanton, 154 Tex. 289, 276

S.W.2d 798 (1955), Houston & T. C. Ky.
Co. v. East, 98 Tex. 146, 81 S.W. 279
(1904).
This right to enter upon the
land and appropriate underground per

colating waters is

an interest in real
estate, and may be exercised by the land
owner or made the subject of an inde
pendent grant of ownership. Evanr v.
Ropte. 128 Tex. 7b, 9G S.W.2d 973 (3936 V

296 S.W. 273, 278, 54 A.L.R. 1397 (1927;
These rights, although not codified, have
been generally recognized by statute as

property rights of sufficient charactej
for ownership. Art. 7880-3c, subsection
D, Vernon's Ann.Tex.Civ.Stats. and Art
7477b, Section 7, Vernon's Ann.Tex.Civ.

Stats.16 Thus, except for Section 2 of
Article 7477b, the general law of the
State of Texas, which recognizes water
that has been withdrawn from under
ground sources as personal property sub
ject to sale and commerce, would allow
the Plaintiffs to withdraw water from

the Mock's land and transport same to the
City of Altus.

This statute, however, seeks to prohibit
the production of underground water for
the purpose of transporting same in in
terstate, commerce, and has the effect of

prohibiting the interstate transportation
of such water after it has become person
al property.

Whether a statute by its

phraseology
prohibits
the
interstate
transportation of an article of commerce
after it has become the personal property
of someone as in the Pennsylvania and
West- cases, or prohibits the withdrawal
of such substance where the intent is to
transport such

the

in

interstate commerce,

result upon interstate commerce is

Fur her. after the waver ha? beer, sppro-

the same. In both situations, the purpose
?nd intent of the statute and the end re
sult thereof is to prohibit the interstate

jrifsted. tht landowner, his lfr?ef cr as

transportation of an article of commerce.

sign, ha? the ri^hi to r-zV- the water to

Clearly, then, Section 2 of this statute

others for use off of the land and outside
the basin where produced, just as he could
sell any other species of property. City

constitutes an unreasonable burden upon

of Corpus Christi v. City of Plessanton,

154 Tex. 289, 276 S.W.2d at 802 (1955);
Pecos County Water Control & Improve
ment Dist. No. 1 v. Williams, 271 S.W.2d
503, 505 (Tex.Civ.App.1954, err. ref. n. r.
e.) ;
15.

Texas Co. v. Burkett, 117 Tex. 16,

interstate commerce.

Plaintiffs should

not be denied by the provisions of such
statute the right to withdraw and move
water in interstate commerce.

The relief prayed for by the Plaintiff?
is in all things granted, and judgment
will be entered accordingly.
owner, his assigns or lessees, of such own-

Article TSS0-3c. subsection D. provides:

n--* :(i or rijrhts, subject, however to tlie

"Tlif ownership end rights of the owner

_.,i..r

of ihe land, his lessees nnd assigns, in un
derground water are hereby recop-ized.

. ■. regulations promulgated pursu-

art U
.»5f Section 3c." The above is
iDivr^uraT^d almost verbatim in Section

and nothing in this Section 3c shall h»»
construed as depriving or divesting K'scii

7 of Article 7477b.
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APPENDIX E

REPUBLICAN RIVER COMPACT

C.R.S.

1973,

37-67-101

Article V

The judgment and all provisions thereof in the case of Adelbert A.
Weiland, as state engineer of Colorado, et al. v. The Pioneer Irrigation
Company, decided June 5, 1922, and reported in 259 U. S. 498, affecting
the Pioneer irrigation ditch or canal, are hereby recognized as binding upon
the states; and Colorado, through its duly authorized officials, shall have the
perpetua] and exclusive right to control and regulate diversions of water at
all times by said canal in conformity with said judgment.
The water heretofore adjudicated to said Pioneer Canal by the district court
of Colorado, in the amount of fifty (50) cubic feet per second of time is
included in and is a part of the total amounts of water hereinbefore allocated
for beneficial consumptive use in Colorado and Nebraska.
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